Wednesday 11 July 2018

The Path: What Chinese Philosophers Can Teach Us About the Good LifeThe Path: What Chinese Philosophers Can Teach Us About the Good Life by Michael Puett
My rating: 5 of 5 stars

Good News From the East

The Path, like the Harvard lectures on which it is based, is exceptionally popular for a book of its kind - on the face of it an esoteric philosophy which doesn’t offer self-help so much as the re-definition of what constitutes self. I suspect, however, that the reason for its appeal is not its ‘doctrines,’ of which it has none, but its offer of a sort of religion which has been lost in the West for almost two millennia. The Path outlines a religion of ethical and ritual habit rather than a religion of faith and belief. The loss of this sort of religion has been so total that many are likely to perceive its suggestions - for this is what they are - as no religion at all.

Religions of faith - notably Christianity and Islam - are relative exceptions in the theological world (see https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...). The distinguishing characteristic of these religions - separating them from the Judaism from which they derive, and from the religions they like to term pagan, including not just the state religion of the Roman and Greek empires but the other world religions of Buddhism, Hinduism, Jainism, etc. - is the idea of doctrinal belief. All other religions except Christianity and Islam articulate what they conceive as correct behaviour rather than correct belief; which actions are necessary for a fulfilling, satisfying and meaningful life, not which thoughts or words of attestation are necessary for salvation.

The introduction to The Path sums up its message succinctly: “you can wield that power of habit, or ‘ritual,’ to achieve things that you never thought were possible, given who you thought you are.” Such an idea is heretical in Christianity; it smacks of Pelagianism, the idea that human beings have some responsibility for, and ability to affect, their own spiritual state without the need for externally supplied ‘grace’ and the system of intellectual beliefs which is purported to be its source. Augustine of Hippo bitterly fought against such a view in the 4th century and embedded it in one form or another in every Christian sect - Catholic, Protestant, and Pentecostal. The logical consequence of his doctrine is the rather dismal idea of pre-destination and the overwhelming imperative to obey ecclesiastical authority.

For members of the religions of faith, faith justifies. It justifies not merely the sinful human being who is judged by God, but it also justifies any behaviour thought necessary by ecclesiastical authority to protect what it deems the tenets of faith. This principle is so inculturated among adherents of faith-based religions that they can barely conceive of a religion without either doctrine or the authority to enforce it. The fact that the perennial Chinese wisdom summarised in The Path is neither dogmatic nor authoritarian, but suggestive and experimental, comes as a pleasing surprise. I think it also helps in its popularity that while this wisdom is social in terms of both its ethical norms and their interpretation, it is not tribal in the mode of requiring attestation to or in a group.

The concept of what might be called ‘ethical habit’ is not new in the West. It was an area of well-developed thought in ancient Greek and Roman civilisation. Socrates, Aristotle, the Stoic philosophers, Cicero and Marcus Aurelius were all advocates of so-called virtue ethics. Christianity and its Pauline insistence on faith as the only necessary virtue, however, more or less crushed any real discussion of this ‘pagan’ practice. Thomas Aquinas had some positive things to say about virtue ethics in the 13th century, but nothing that would compromise the pre-eminence of faith as the only necessary condition for the good life.

Interestingly, it is mainly Catholic moral philosophers of the 20th century who have revived interest in virtue ethics. Elizabeth Anscombe established her reputation on the defense of virtue ethics in 1958. Since then a number of moral philosophers have followed suit - Alasdair MacIntyre, Philippa Foot, and Stanley Hauerwas, among others. Collectively they have taken what has become know as the ‘areatic’ turn (from the Greek for virtue) in moral philosophy, that is, a turn precisely in the direction suggested by Chinese thought and Michael Puett.

Nonetheless, this areatic turn has had nothing like the impact that Puett’s course, or his book, has had on the spiritual imagination, especially among the young. Puett is not peddling some new version of peace and love hippiedom among his Harvard students. This is serious stuff; and it is being taken seriously. And I suspect the reason for its relative acceptance compared with modern virtue ethics is precisely because it is free from the dogmatic requirements for faith that are implicit in the Western versions.

Virtue ethics, when taken seriously, is a contradiction to Christianity (and I suspect in Islam for the same reason). If faith saves then virtue either follows or it is irrelevant. If faith is not necessary for the practice of virtue (and it demonstrably isn’t) then faith itself seems fatally compromised. What Chinese wisdom and Puett provide is a virtue ethics, a way of living one’s life, without the baggage of faith and its spiritual as well as intellectual non-sequiturs. This kind of responsible freedom hasn’t been available for public debate for some considerable time. This alone makes Puett’s thoughts important. They also happen to be very interesting.

Postscript: For more on doctrinal religions and their consequences, see: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...

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