Fundamentalism and American Culture
by
by
It Must Be In the Water
In a previous review I put forward the suggestion that the evangelical movement in the United States is not comprehensible as a religious movement at all. (https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...) While maintaining the nominal title of ‘Christian’ the various sects which participate in this movement, from traditionalist Catholics to holiness Pentecostals, to Mormons have almost nothing in common theologically. Rather, the binding force among the participants is ethical and collective not doctrinal and personal; that is to say, it is political. The evangelical common cause is the execution of a political agenda which is headlined by their Big Four issues of abortion, gay sex and marriage, global warming, and evolution. Not all segments of the coalition adopt all four issues but endorsement of any one is sufficient for political alliance.
I further suggested that these issues were likely manifestations of more fundamental social sentiment, that the moral outrage expressed about each of the Big Four pointed not to social welfare as their aim but to their own political advantage. I put forward the hypothesis that the advantage they seek is the re-establishment of some sort of social equality. This equality is not simply a matter of legal standing or economics, but of a kind of general respectability which they feel has been denied them through a variety of social changes in the United States brought about by technology, immigration, global economics and what might be called a reduction in traditional reputational opportunities.
Marsden‘s classic history of Fundamentalism and American Culture is an important source for assessing whether my hypothesis has any validity. Marsden, like Jonathan Dudley of Broken Words, is an evangelical. He is also a widely respected historian. So, unlike mine, his motives are clean. Nonetheless, I think that even a sympathetic reading of Fundamentalism and American Culture confirms much of what I have suggested, namely that the evangelical movement from its origins was always primarily political rather than theological. It seeks to essentially reshape the legal structure of the country to eliminate what it considers Enlightenment errors. This is particularly clear from the 1870’s onwards to the end of the century as the movement began to form its explicit political existence.
The Evangelicalism that Marsden documents has three distinctive characteristics which persist from the late 19th century through today: an anti-intellectualism which rejects the validity of scientific thought; a local communal attractiveness to those who are socially needy in the traditionally bleak socio-economic context of the United States; and a susceptibility to authoritarian leadership by what can only be called religious hucksters. I will touch on each of these briefly.
Anti-Intellectualism
Marsden is very direct that “a major element in the movement, well developed in nineteenth century revivalism, was the subordination of all other concerns—including concern for all but the simplest ideas—to soul-saving and practical Christianity.” This aversion to rational thought and debate increased proportionately to the vulnerability of traditional biblical interpretations to the evidence generated by so-called higher criticism. That scriptural vulnerability was further increased by the difficulties presented by evolutionary theory. Even into the 21st century the resistance to otherwise uncontested facts of successive biblical redactions, alterations and historical interpretations carry no weight among evangelicals. Similarly, the findings of anthropological, archaeological and biological science are either ignored or explained as a sort of cosmic divine charade.
Fulfillment of Neurotic Social Need
Marsden is once again unsparing in his opinion: “My conclusion, which finds expression in a variety of specific ways, is that fundamentalists experienced profound ambivalence toward the surrounding culture.” I don’t think that it’s incorrect to imply from his remarks that this alienation a cause not a consequence for the growth of evangelicalism. The movement attracts a type. This may include those “whose common identity is substantially grounded in the fundamentalist experience of an earlier era,” as this more simple existence is eroded. But Marsden suggests a rather more complex psychology: “These fundamentalist attitudes cannot be understood in terms of a consistent ideology. They make sense only in terms of the establishment-or-outsider paradox.” On the one hand, the evangelical sentiment is one of being special, chosen, elected. But this is combined with feelings of inferiority among one’s fellow citizens. Thus there is a pattern with the movement despite its diversity: “Every new evangelical movement of this entire era, through the rise of fundamentalism and including the holiness, pentecostal, and premillennial movements, had a base in some form of ‘social religious’ gathering.”
Susceptibility to Authoritarian Leadership
“For a substantial number of Americans, or American evangelicals, something in their outlook was conducive to the authoritarian and ideological character of dispensationalism as well as to the sentiment and activism more usually associated with American revivalism.” Evangelicalism emerged from the long-standing revivalist tradition in America. The core of this tradition is the complete submission of the believer to the influence of the preacher within the context of a believing audience. In the late 19th this tradition evolved into an era of the celebrity preacher who didn’t just preach at irregular intervals. He organized and directed followers beyond a local congregation. He told these followers what to think and how to act through a network, first of publications, then of broadcast media, and most recently, of course, the internet. All rely on a charismatic personality cult with a particular skill in fund-raising rather than theology. This was a new ‘system’ of religion: “This system encouraged personal empire-building which developed during Moody’s time... “It was a religion structured according to the free enterprise system.”*
————
Marsden all but admits that the these characteristics of the evangelical movement serve a primarily political purpose. “Respectable ‘evangelicals’ in the 1870s, by the 1920s had become a laughingstock, ideological strangers in their own land.” While this may be a shared feeling it is not yet political. But Marsden goes on: “The fundamentalists’ most alarming experience was that of finding themselves living in a culture that by the 1920s was openly turning away from God.” This is not personal; it is not even spiritual. It implies a straightforward political objective: not the salvation of souls but the re-formation of American society.
What is at stake for Evangelicals is a certain kind of politics, one that restores “the Biblical foundations of American civilization.” The Dispensationalists among them, the dominant political force, say openly that their objective is to prepare for the 1000-year reign of Jesus by establishing a culture ready to receive him, including a theocratic government. I don’t think it coincidental that this sounds remarkably like the last 1000-year Reich we are familiar with. A dangerous place this America.
————
*The Chicago preacher Dwight Moody was arguably the first of these celebrity evangelists. Interestingly he too had his Big Four issues at the turn of the 20th century: “(1) the theater, (2) disregard of the Sabbath, (3) Sunday newspapers, and (4) atheistic teachings, including evolution.” These were prosecuted with equal vigour to that employed on today’s Big Four. Let us hope with equal effect.
In a previous review I put forward the suggestion that the evangelical movement in the United States is not comprehensible as a religious movement at all. (https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...) While maintaining the nominal title of ‘Christian’ the various sects which participate in this movement, from traditionalist Catholics to holiness Pentecostals, to Mormons have almost nothing in common theologically. Rather, the binding force among the participants is ethical and collective not doctrinal and personal; that is to say, it is political. The evangelical common cause is the execution of a political agenda which is headlined by their Big Four issues of abortion, gay sex and marriage, global warming, and evolution. Not all segments of the coalition adopt all four issues but endorsement of any one is sufficient for political alliance.
I further suggested that these issues were likely manifestations of more fundamental social sentiment, that the moral outrage expressed about each of the Big Four pointed not to social welfare as their aim but to their own political advantage. I put forward the hypothesis that the advantage they seek is the re-establishment of some sort of social equality. This equality is not simply a matter of legal standing or economics, but of a kind of general respectability which they feel has been denied them through a variety of social changes in the United States brought about by technology, immigration, global economics and what might be called a reduction in traditional reputational opportunities.
Marsden‘s classic history of Fundamentalism and American Culture is an important source for assessing whether my hypothesis has any validity. Marsden, like Jonathan Dudley of Broken Words, is an evangelical. He is also a widely respected historian. So, unlike mine, his motives are clean. Nonetheless, I think that even a sympathetic reading of Fundamentalism and American Culture confirms much of what I have suggested, namely that the evangelical movement from its origins was always primarily political rather than theological. It seeks to essentially reshape the legal structure of the country to eliminate what it considers Enlightenment errors. This is particularly clear from the 1870’s onwards to the end of the century as the movement began to form its explicit political existence.
The Evangelicalism that Marsden documents has three distinctive characteristics which persist from the late 19th century through today: an anti-intellectualism which rejects the validity of scientific thought; a local communal attractiveness to those who are socially needy in the traditionally bleak socio-economic context of the United States; and a susceptibility to authoritarian leadership by what can only be called religious hucksters. I will touch on each of these briefly.
Anti-Intellectualism
Marsden is very direct that “a major element in the movement, well developed in nineteenth century revivalism, was the subordination of all other concerns—including concern for all but the simplest ideas—to soul-saving and practical Christianity.” This aversion to rational thought and debate increased proportionately to the vulnerability of traditional biblical interpretations to the evidence generated by so-called higher criticism. That scriptural vulnerability was further increased by the difficulties presented by evolutionary theory. Even into the 21st century the resistance to otherwise uncontested facts of successive biblical redactions, alterations and historical interpretations carry no weight among evangelicals. Similarly, the findings of anthropological, archaeological and biological science are either ignored or explained as a sort of cosmic divine charade.
Fulfillment of Neurotic Social Need
Marsden is once again unsparing in his opinion: “My conclusion, which finds expression in a variety of specific ways, is that fundamentalists experienced profound ambivalence toward the surrounding culture.” I don’t think that it’s incorrect to imply from his remarks that this alienation a cause not a consequence for the growth of evangelicalism. The movement attracts a type. This may include those “whose common identity is substantially grounded in the fundamentalist experience of an earlier era,” as this more simple existence is eroded. But Marsden suggests a rather more complex psychology: “These fundamentalist attitudes cannot be understood in terms of a consistent ideology. They make sense only in terms of the establishment-or-outsider paradox.” On the one hand, the evangelical sentiment is one of being special, chosen, elected. But this is combined with feelings of inferiority among one’s fellow citizens. Thus there is a pattern with the movement despite its diversity: “Every new evangelical movement of this entire era, through the rise of fundamentalism and including the holiness, pentecostal, and premillennial movements, had a base in some form of ‘social religious’ gathering.”
Susceptibility to Authoritarian Leadership
“For a substantial number of Americans, or American evangelicals, something in their outlook was conducive to the authoritarian and ideological character of dispensationalism as well as to the sentiment and activism more usually associated with American revivalism.” Evangelicalism emerged from the long-standing revivalist tradition in America. The core of this tradition is the complete submission of the believer to the influence of the preacher within the context of a believing audience. In the late 19th this tradition evolved into an era of the celebrity preacher who didn’t just preach at irregular intervals. He organized and directed followers beyond a local congregation. He told these followers what to think and how to act through a network, first of publications, then of broadcast media, and most recently, of course, the internet. All rely on a charismatic personality cult with a particular skill in fund-raising rather than theology. This was a new ‘system’ of religion: “This system encouraged personal empire-building which developed during Moody’s time... “It was a religion structured according to the free enterprise system.”*
————
Marsden all but admits that the these characteristics of the evangelical movement serve a primarily political purpose. “Respectable ‘evangelicals’ in the 1870s, by the 1920s had become a laughingstock, ideological strangers in their own land.” While this may be a shared feeling it is not yet political. But Marsden goes on: “The fundamentalists’ most alarming experience was that of finding themselves living in a culture that by the 1920s was openly turning away from God.” This is not personal; it is not even spiritual. It implies a straightforward political objective: not the salvation of souls but the re-formation of American society.
What is at stake for Evangelicals is a certain kind of politics, one that restores “the Biblical foundations of American civilization.” The Dispensationalists among them, the dominant political force, say openly that their objective is to prepare for the 1000-year reign of Jesus by establishing a culture ready to receive him, including a theocratic government. I don’t think it coincidental that this sounds remarkably like the last 1000-year Reich we are familiar with. A dangerous place this America.
————
*The Chicago preacher Dwight Moody was arguably the first of these celebrity evangelists. Interestingly he too had his Big Four issues at the turn of the 20th century: “(1) the theater, (2) disregard of the Sabbath, (3) Sunday newspapers, and (4) atheistic teachings, including evolution.” These were prosecuted with equal vigour to that employed on today’s Big Four. Let us hope with equal effect.
posted by The Mind of BlackOxford @ January 15, 2019
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