Teaching Plato in Palestine: Philosophy in a Divided World by Carlos Fraenkel
My rating: 2 of 5 stars

Idolatry in the Modern World

The thesis of Teaching Plato in Palestine is that honest philosophical discussion creates understanding among people with conflicting interests. Such understanding, Fraenkel believes, can lead to truths which can be recognised and appreciated by all. To achieve this we must create a “‘culture of debate’” [the double quotes are necessary since he constantly uses them in the text].

In taking such a stand, Fraenkel appears as a typically liberal academic who, perhaps a little naively, thinks that talking is better than fighting. Who could possibly disagree? But his rather sentimental attachment to academic philosophy masks his deeply ingrained dedication to continuing the error that is the cause of much violence in the first place: the idolatry of language.

The thought that argument - a logical progression of statements based on explicit presumptions - can lead to changed minds much less human solidarity is simply ludicrous. He forgets that there are two principle forms of logical argument: modus tollens and modus poenens. The latter takes the form of ‘if p then q’ and then seeks to prove that ‘p’ is the case thus establishing the truth of the conclusion ‘q’. Modus poenens is how we typically make our argument, moving step by step up a chain of reasoning.

But modus tollens is how we listen to someone else’s argument. This has a similar initial logical structure: ‘if p then q.’ But then there’s a turnaround because this also implies ‘if not-q then not-p.’ Few of us pay attention to an ascending chain of reasoning. We know by experience that this is inefficient. We know instinctively that if we don’t agree with a conclusion, it’s because buried deeply in any argument is an implicit ‘p’ that is untenable. And we know that those making arguments are keen to hide this hidden ‘p’ from us. Since we disagree with the conclusion ‘q’, we know there is dud link somewhere in the chain of reasoning.*

And there is indeed such a dud link in Fraenkel’s argument. He believes that agreement about words and how they fit together - things like principles, moral codes, philosophical systems, indeed logic itself - implies agreement about what might be called our life-interests, those things that are not words which are important to us. The words we use to describe these things - family, nation, God, wealth, reputation, culture of debate - mean very different things to different people. Words are only defined in terms of other words, never in terms of personal experiences. This quite apart from the fact that some of these experiences have never been or even can be described in words.

Fraenkel thinks that words are the ultimate bringers of peace. He’s delusional. At best they are agreements to suspend hostilities (treaties). At worst words are what create and solidify animosity (manifestos). The various Christian creeds provide ample proof of the use of words to establish tribal solidarity at the expense of violence in a larger community. Words become idols more readily and more pervasively than any golden calf or Roman house-god.

The danger of agreement about words is far greater than the opposite. Agreement gives the illusion of fixity, that the words are more than words, that they describe reality. Words are not reality. This is the liberal political fallacy. And it is Fraenkel’s erroneous presumption. His argument is vacuous. It can lead nowhere rational. It is also dangerous because the making of such arguments can only increase mutual suspicion and hostility when their vacuity becomes clear.

I believe that violence is always evil, that power which can exercise violence must always be mistrusted, that power exists in society primarily as a consequence of words, and that words are therefore as dangerous as they are useful. Words like Islam, Israel, Christianity are obviously so. Words like Rationality, Debate, Clarity are less obvious but no less potent forms of potential power. Arguments always contain inherent interests, which may not even be visible to those arguing. Debate may reveal those hidden interests, or make known ones more entrenched. But they never can resolve interests which conflict. Such resolution is a matter of religious conversion, love, or mental imbalance, not good arguments.

*As I write this, I am listening to the latest news about the Trump impeachment hearings. The public response to allegations about Trump has always demonstrated modus tollens as the dominant mode of listening. Almost all Democrats think the man is a crook. Almost all Republicans think he is being persecuted. The arguments presented are virtually meaningless.

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