Einstein's Fridge: How the Difference Between Hot and Cold Explains the Universe by Paul Sen
My rating: 2 of 5 stars

Three Cheers For Thinking

According to Sen scientists are great guys (almost exclusively guys) and the unrecognised heroes of history (as opposed to politicians and other notables). They have revealed to us the truth about the universe and how it works. Their prophecies should be heeded. So his book is a sort of modern hagiography of the secular saints of that field which he believes is the most enduring and useful of all the sciences, namely thermodynamics. Of interest to me however are the implications of Sen’s intellectual biographies for the philosophy of science.

A great deal of practical progress has been made by being wrong. For example, one of Sen’s heroes is Nicolas Carnot, the man he considers the founder of thermodynamics. Like Newton’s theory of gravity, which is conceptually incorrect but useful in sending astronauts to the moon; and Michael Faraday’s theory of electricity, which was equally wrong, but allowed the extensive development of electric motor technology, Carnot’s theory of heat is actually incoherent. Yet his ideas form the basis for an entire science.

I think it’s important to recognise that these people were not just a bit wrong in their thinking so that a little tinkering with their ideas could correct their errors. They were fundamentally in error. Carnot’s ‘caloric’ theory of heat turned out to be nonsense. It was replaced by an entirely different conceptual description, which in turn gave way to yet further fundamental changes in thermodynamic theory. The fact that each wave of theory produced greater practical results masks the uncontested fact fact that all previous thinking was shown to be wrong in its essentials. Not just wrong in details, or wrong in the level of specificity or conceptual expression. They were completely misguided.

At least they were misguided in terms of subsequent scientific developments. Each epoch of development represented a decisive conceptual break, a discontinuity, with the past. The theories of Josiah Gibbs and Pierre Duhem, for example share almost nothing with that of Carnot. It is the case that they allow much more to be accomplished. Pragmatist philosophers would like us to believe therefore that later theories are closer to the truth of more congruent with reality than previous theories. This despite the fact that every previous conceptual expression has a view of reality that is contrary to latest thinking.

In other words, what constitutes reality is constantly changing in science. Reality is whatever we think of as reality lately. We know that this reality will not be the one that survives the next conceptual revolution. There is nothing else against which to measure our conceptions except the next set of conceptions, which will always claim authority because they produce more results. But aside from that, they have no claim at all to a better description of reality, much less the truth of those descriptions.

Sen makes his intention in re-telling the story of the development of thermodynamics clear. “This book is an argument that the history of science is the history that matters,” he says. I think he’s right. But what I find incomprehensible about the book is that he also thinks that history matters because of great minds. What clearly matters, according to his account, is not the individual minds, great or not, but the historical community of scientists and engineers within which a continuous conversation about ‘heat’ has taken place. The fact that the topic had no fixed meaning within this conversation is it’s most remarkable feature.

Thermodynamics has obviously given us power. But this power is the result of talking, not a better understanding of the universe. Arguably, given the paradoxes and inconsistencies of modern physics, our conception of the real is as primitive as that of the early Greek philosophers. Yet, Sen is keen to quote Einstein who said of thermodynamics, “It is the only physical theory of universal content, which I am convinced… will never be overthrown.” Perhaps, but doesn’t Einstein sound more than a bit like Lord Kelvin in his late 19th century pronouncement that Newtonian physics had almost completed a final description of the universe?

Regarding the Pragmatist objection that we now can do much more than we have ever done before because of our scientific knowledge: all one can say is that all the results aren’t in yet. As Sen says, “The story of thermodynamics is not only one about how humans acquire scientific knowledge, it is also about how that knowledge is shaped by and, in turn, shapes society.” He shows how scientific knowledge is achieved haphazardly, and that knowledge affects society with at least as much randomness. Yet he professes no sense of humility much less awe about our condition of fundamental ignorance. We actually have no idea what future science will reveal. But we do know based on experience that it too will remain ignorant of whatever is ‘there.’

So success is whatever passes for success. And people like Sen are there as boosters and cheerleaders. His account of scientists and their breakthroughs is at times fascinating. But his assessment of what all this thought means I find simply banal. It is only vaguely interesting that Einstein designed a safer refrigerator. There are so much more important things to say about science and scientists, don’t you think?

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